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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
have refused to tamper with the Florida judgment and yet re-
frained from holding the statute unconstitutional. The result of
the decision might be that similar suits will be precluded even
where the facts present a desirable case for modification. By
holding the statute unconstitutional, it appears that the Colorado
Supreme Court has unnecessarily limited the power of its state's
courts to adjudicate matters involving recognition of foreign
judgments.
Patrick T. Caffery
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - THREE-YEAR PRESCRIPTION ON
INDICTMENTS
On September 21, 1951, a bill of information was filed
a,;ainst defendants charging them with unlawful possession of
narcotics. The arraignment was held on October 15, 1951, but
the case was not set for trial until September 30, 1954. On the
date of the trial, defendants filed a plea of prescription based
upon article 8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.' They con-
tended that since more than three years had elapsed without
trial since the date of the filing of the bill of information, the
charge should be dismissed. The state contended, on the other
hand, that under article 9 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 2
the arraignment of defendants was a prosecutive step which
started a new three-year prescriptive period and that the date
set for trial was within the new period. The trial court rejected
the state's contention and sustained defendant's plea of prescrip-
tion. On appeal, held, affirmed. Articles 8 and 9 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure establish separate three-year prescriptive
periods. Under article 8, if three years elapse in a felony case
invoked in the instant case) a Texas decree ordering a husband to support a
daughter in his wife's custody until the age of sixteen, was not a final judgment
and not entitled to full faith and credit. It ordered the husband to pay additional
future alimony.
1. LA. R.S. 15:8 (1950). The pertinent provisions of article 8 state: "In
felony cases when three years elapse from the date of finding an indictment, or
filing an information, . . . it shall be the duty of the district attorney to enter a
nolle prosequi if the accused has not been tried, and if the district attorney fail or
neglect to do so, the court may on motion of the defendant or his attorney cause
such nolle prosequi to be entered."
2. LA. R.S. 15:9 (1950) : "Whenever it shall have been established to the
satisfaction of any court in which any criminal prosecution shall be pending that
the prescriptive periods as herein provided have elapsed since the last date upon
which any steps shall have been taken by the state in such prosecution, and that
the district attorney has not entered his nolle prosequi, the court shall order the
dismissal of said prosecution ... "
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from the date of filing the bill of information without trial of
an accused or without interruption of prescription by an act of
the accused, the court may cause a nolle prosequi to be entered.
State v. Bradley, 227 La. 421, 79 So.2d 561 (1955).
The Louisiana Constitution3 guarantees the accused in a
criminal prosecution the right to a speedy trial. Articles 8 and
9 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are designed to assure the
accused in a felony4 case that this right will be protected by pro-
viding that, except for certain interrupting circumstances, the
accused must be tried within three years of the date of the
charge. Until the instant case, the possibility of there being two
distinct prescriptive periods of three years under articles 8 and
9 does not seem to have been considered by the Supreme Court.6
In previous holdings the Supreme Court treated article 8 as
establishing the prescription of three years on dormant charges,
and article 9 as setting forth the procedure by which a defendant
could obtain a judicial nolle prosequi.6 In two of these earlier
cases, the court characterized the period within which the ac-
cused must be brought to trial under articles 8 and 9 as "the pre-
scriptive period. ' 'T
The instant case, however, placed before the Supreme Court
for the first time the problem of interpreting the language of
article 9 to the effect that "whenever... the prescriptive periods
... have elapsed since the last date upon which any steps shall
have been taken by the state in such prosecution" the prosecu-
tion shall be ordered dismissed. The state relied upon this lan-
guage to support its contention that a new prescriptive period
had begun on the filing of the arraignment, which constituted
the last prosecutive step.8 Under this interpretation, however,
3. LA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
4. Articles 8 and 9 also provide for a prescriptive period of two years from
the indictment in non-felony cases. Only the three-year period applicable to felony
cases will be discussed in this note, but the discussion is equally applicable to the
two-year period in non-felony cases.
5. For a discussion prior to the instant case of the three-year prescription,
see Comment, Prescription of Criminal Prosecutions in Louisiana, 15 LOUISIANA
LAW RmEEw 192, 196 (1954).
6. Comment, Prescription of Criminal Prosecutions, 6 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
274, 279 (1945).
7. State v. Shushan, 204 La. 672, 681, 16 So.2d 227, 230 (1943) ; State v.
Gunter, 188 La. 314, 317, 177 So. 60, 61 (1937).
8. See State v. Edrington, 11 Orl. App. 288, 289 (La. App. 1914) for a defi-
nition of prosecutive step as "some formal move before the court, intended to
hasten the judgment." It is defined in a civil case, Augusta Sugar v. Haley, 163 La.
814, 816, 112 So. 731, 732 (1927) as "something more than a mere passive effort
to keep the suit on the docket of the court." See Note, 16 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
199 (1955) for a discussion of this problem in civil cases.
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it would be within the power of the district attorney to keep a
charge pending indefinitely, simply by taking a step in the prose-
cution whenever the three-year period was about to elapse. The
court appears to have alluded to this problem in the recent case
of State v. Murray.9 There the court indicated that the right to
be tried within three years of an indictment is absolute, unless
the delay results from the accused's own action or inability to
stand trial. This interpretation of article 8 would preclude any
idea that article 9 provides a second prescriptive period. It
would also constitute a rejection of the contention that article
9 provides the state with a method of interrupting prescription.
The decision in the instant case in effect constitutes a rejec-
tion of the approach suggested in the Murray case. Although the
court gave no reason for doing so, a possible explanation would
be that the approach of the Murray case would render-the rele-
vant portions of article 9 ineffective. By holding that articles
8 and 9 provide for two prescriptive periods the court apparently
felt that it had given effect to the language of both articles. It
is submitted, however, that the interpretation given in the in-
stant case also fails to present a complete solution to the
problem.
In the instant case, the court concluded that the two articles
were drawn to provide two separate and unrelated prescriptive
periods; the period under article 8 running from the date of the
charge, and that under article 9 from the date of the last prose-
cutive step. The court found support for this distinction in the
fact that articles 8 and 9 are couched in different language. Ar-
ticle 8 states that the court "may . . . cause such nolle prosequi
to be entered," while article 9 states "the court shall order dis-
missal of said prosecution." (Emphasis added.) Thus, if the
accused is not brought to trial within three years from the date
of the charge, the trial judge may, in his discretion, enter a nolle
9. 222 La. 950, 64 So.2d 230 (1953). In discussing the possibility that, in a
theft case, the state could reduce the original charge by one dollar each year and
file a new bill, thus keeping the charge hanging over the accused for many years,
the court said: "But, apart from this, there is no reason to suppose that the
courts would permit the State to indulge in the practice feared by counsel as
LSA-R.S. 15:8 also provides that, in felony cases, the accused must be bfought
to trial within 3 years from the date of finding an indictment or filing an infor-
mation, and, if he is not, the court may cause the charge to be nolle prosequied.
Accordingly, any use of the privilege accorded the State to recharge a defendant
with crime based on the same facts is specially limited by this requirement that
he be tried within three years from the date of the original charge." Id. at 956, 64
So.2d at 232. The problem is also discussed in the subject case. State v. Bradley,
79 So.2d 561, 564 (La. 1955).
(Vol. XVI
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prosequi. On the other hand, if the accused is not brought to
trial within three years of the last prosecutive step, the trial
judge must enter a nolle prosequi.
This interpretation could prove troublesome. By holding the
language of article 8 to be permissive, the Supreme Court seems
to have granted the trial judge power to defeat the purpose of
the three-year prescriptive rule, which is to assure the accused
the right to a speedy trial. Under this interpretation, the trial
judge could refuse to nolle prosequi an indictment despite the
fact that the accused has been available for prosecution during
the entire three-year period. It is improbable, however, that the
Supreme Court would permit the trial judge to exercise his pow-
ers in such arbitrary fashion 0 and would no doubt find the re-
fusal to nolle prosequi the indictment to be an abuse of discre-
tion." This would raise a further question as to whether the
second prescriptive period provided for in article 9 would ever
be applicable. To hold it to be an abuse of discretion to refuse to
nolle prosequi an indictment in such case would in effect pre-
vent application of the second prescriptive period, since the first
period would, in most cases, expire before the second.
There are other practical problems presented by the Supreme
Court's designation of two separate prescriptive periods. Notable
among these is the question whether or not the mandatory pre-
scriptive period from the last prosecutive step, as set out in
10. In the instant case the court stated: "It is conceivable that three years
could elapse after the filing of a bill of information without the defendant's being
brought to trial, and that the district attorney would refuse to enter a nolle
prosequi because he felt that there was a valid reason for the State's delay. If
the trial judge on motion of the defendant rules the district attorney to show
cause why a nolle prosequi should not be entered, and after hearing decides that
the trial of the accused has been delayed for a justifiable reason, the court can
refuse to enter a nolle prosequi." State v. Bradley, 79 So.2d 561, 563 (La. 1955).
The court does not indicate what would be a justifiable reason for delaying the
trial beyond three years. However, in light of the purpose of the prescriptive
period, and the opinion in the case of State v. Murray, 222 La. 950, 64 So.2d 230
(1953), it is submitted that the only justifiable reasons for a delay in excess of
three years would be acts of the accused which prevent his being brought to trial,
or the occurrence of circumstances beyond the control of the state which prevent
the accused from being brought to trial. See note 14 infra.
11. In other areas where the trial judge has been granted discretionary powers,
the court has held that these powers must be reasonably exercised. See, e.g., State
v. Pearson, 224 La. 393, 69 So.2d 512 (1953) and State v. Leming, 217 La. 257,
46 So.2d 262 (1950) (trial judge's refusal to grant a change of venue will be
reversed if an abuse of discretion is shown) ; State v. Verdin, 192 La. 275, 187
So. 666 (1939) and State v. Soileau, 173 La. 531, 138 So. 92 (1931) (refusal of
a trial judge to allow a change in plea held to be an abuse of discretion) ; State
v. Wilson, 181 La. 61, 158 So. 621 (1935) and State v. Martin, 145 La. 35, 81
So. 747 (1919) (refusal of the trial judge to grant a continuance held to be an
abuse of discretion).
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article 9, can be interrupted or suspended. Article 8 expressly
provides the methods by which the period set forth in that ar-
ticle can be interrupted, 2 but the only provision of article 9
which mentions interruption of prescription refers to the period
established in article 8.13 This may give rise to the argument
that the mandatory period cannot be interrupted by acts of the
accused. If this position were taken, an accused who absconds
from justice after a step is taken in his prosecution would be
entitled as of right to a nolle prosequi after three years has ex-
pired. It is unlikely that the Supreme Court would allow such
a result to occur. To avoid this anomaly, the court could apply
article 8 by analogy to article 9 by holding that the mandatory
period can be interrupted by acts of the accused which prevent
his being brought to trial within the prescriptive period. A sim-
ilar result could be achieved by application of the principle estab-
lished by the jurisprudence, that the accused must have been
amenable to prosecution at all times during the period for the
prescription to run. 4
Nevertheless, the action of the court in the instant case, in
dismissing the prosecution, appears to be correct under either
interpretation of articles 8 and 9. If the articles provide for two
prescriptive periods, it was within the trial judge's discretion to
enter a nolle prosequi under article 8. The same result would be
reached under the concept of a single period. As pointed out pre-
viously, a prosecutive step taken by the state should not be al-
lowed to interrupt a period which has been established to insure
the defendant's being brought to trial with reasonable prompt-
ness.
12. "Nothing in this article shall apply or extend to an accused person who has
absconded, or -who is a fugitive from justice or who has escaped trial through
dilatory pleas, or continuances obtained by him or in his behalf."
13. "[Tlhat unless the defendant has posted requisite appearance bond, the
prescription established in Art. 8 hereof shall be interrupted by the absence of the
defendant from the jurisdiction of said court without the written consent of the
court first obtained and entered upon the minutes, or filed in the records of the
cause."
14. The decision in State v. Theard, 212 La. 1022, 34 So.2d 248 (1948) is an
illustration of this principle. In the Theard case, the accused was charged with the
crime on September 1, 1936. In December of 1937, he applied for the appointment
of a lunacy commission, and on April 20, 1938, he was adjudged insane. On May
11, 1944, the accused was adjudged to be presently sane, but he was not arraigned
until March 11, 1947. The court held that the prescriptive period was suspended
by the Insanity of the accused, since his insanity was a circumstance beyond his
control. The action was held to be prescribed since the time between the charge
and the decree of insanity together with the time that had expired from the judg-
ment of sanity exceeded three years. In arriving at the decision the court pointed
out the fact that the defendant was not amenable to prosecution during the time
of his Insanity, and thus prescription could not continue to run.
[Vol. XVI
NOTES
Much of the confusion in the present law relating to prescrip-
tion of criminal prosecutions results from the cumbersome
structure of these two articles. Article 8 contains provisions
relating to three different prescriptive periods,15 and article 9
either supplements article 8 or adds a fourth prescriptive period.
Although the decision in the subject case was an attempt to bring
order to this confusion, it does not appear to have improved upon
the original situation. It is submitted that the most logical rem-
edy to the situation is corrective legislation. In order to avoid
the present confusion in structure and language, the prescriptive
period for charging the crime and the period for bringing the
defendant to trial after the charge is filed should be stated in
separate articles, each including its own provisions as to inter-
ruption and suspension. The provision for the three-year period
should include the following:
(1) The period should begin to run from the date of the
charge.
(2) After the lapse of three years, an accused should have
an absolute right to a nolle prosequi if he can show that nothing
has occurred that would cause the period to be interrupted or
suspended.
(3) Interruption of the period should be limited to acts of
the accused as now provided in articles 8 and 9.
(4) A provision for suspension -of the period by occurrences
not within the control of the state or the accused should also be
included in order to codify the rules developed by the courts on
the subject.10
William J. Doran, Jr.
LABOR LAW - RIGHT TO WORK ACT - RESTRAINT OF
PEACEFUL PICKETING
Plaintiff was engaged in the business of operating a super-
market. Two of its employees, both of whom were meatcutters
15. Article 8 provides for a one-year prescription upon the filing of the indict-
ment running from the time the offense has been made known to the authorities.
It also provides for a prescription of six months from the date of the offense on
prosecutions for any fine or forfeiture.
16. E.g., concerning the insanity of the accused, see State v. Theard, 212 La.
1022, 34 So.2d 248 (1948). For a general discussion see Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 462
(1953).
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